In ancient times, philosophers speculated that we couldn’t tell whether the world around us was genuine or whether other people had minds. Perhaps I am the only one who exists, while the rest of the world is my imagination. It could all be a dream. Some religions claim that gods created this universe and that we are like them. According to the Bible, God said, ‘Let us make mankind in our image, in our likeness.’

For a long time, we couldn’t tell why this world might not be real or how the gods could have created it. That changed with recent advances in information technology. This universe could be a simulation. We believe that our senses register an external reality, so we ignore evidence to the contrary. You may think you see a pipe when watching an image. The caption of the famous painting The Treachery of Images by René Magritte makes you notice: ‘This is not a pipe.’

In 1977, science fiction writer Philip K. Dick was the first to assert that our reality is computer-generated. In a press conference in France, he described his psychotic experiences and coincidences that led him to believe this world is fake. He told the audience that his lost memories returned in full for unknown reasons. He also claimed to have had a vision. And a scenario Dick wrote came true. He thought what he had found was of momentous importance to humanity, so he organised that press conference. His last name suggests that our Creator, if there is one, likes sexist jokes.

The idea that we live inside a computer-generated world is known as the simulation hypothesis. We could all live in a simulation created by an advanced humanoid civilisation. Professor Nick Bostrom explored its probability in the simulation argument. According to Bostrom, there could be many different human civilisations. The humans in those civilisations may, at some point, enhance themselves with biotechnology and information technology, live very long, and acquire capabilities that ordinary humans don’t have. These beings are no longer humans, but are called post-humans. A post-human might be a biological creature, a humanlike artificial intelligence or a combination of both. They might be brains in vats or have no physical bodies at all.

These post-humans might feel the urge to run simulations of their human-ancestor civilisations, so we could be living in one of those simulations. Bostrom argues that at least one of the following options must be true:

1. Nearly all human civilisations terminate before becoming post-human.
2. In any post-human civilisation, only a negligible number of individuals develop an appetite for simulating their human-ancestor civilisations.
3. We almost certainly live inside a computer simulation.¹

The argument comes with the following assumptions that seem increasingly plausible due to the recent developments in artificial intelligence, but are not proven:

• The computing power of post-human civilisations is sufficient to run numerous simulations of human-ancestor civilisations.
• It is possible to simulate human consciousness in a computer.¹

Bostrom concludes that if you think our civilisation will one day become post-human and run many simulations of human ancestor civilisations, you must believe we already live inside one.¹ It is a matter of probability. If we invent this technology in the next 10, 100 or 1,000 years, it won’t happen later than that. By then, we will have done it. But millions of years have passed since it could have happened, so it probably did. If we do it within 100 years, and it could have happened a million years ago, the chance that it already happened is (1,000,000 – 100) / 1,000,000 = 0.9999, or 99.99%.

Non-humanoid civilisations are probably not interested in running large numbers of simulations of human civilisations. They might run a few for research, perhaps to investigate human behaviour, but it seems unlikely that our emotions and history entertain beings entirely different from us. Thus, most simulations of human civilisations will likely be run by post-humans.

Non-humanoid civilisations are probably not interested in running large numbers of simulations of human civilisations. They might run a few for research, perhaps to investigate human behaviour. Still, it seems unlikely that our history and emotions interest beings entirely different from us enough for them to run billions of simulations of human civilisations. And if they exist, they must first learn to travel faster than the speed of light to find humans. Thus, post-humans will likely run most simulations of human civilisations. So, our Creator, if there is one, is probably post-human.

Philosophy is the art of not accepting what seems obvious because the possibilities are boundless. That is why what seems obvious often isn’t the case. With the information we do have, it is our best guess. We think of God as having a human nature because we imagine God. The God in the Bible has human traits. Conversely, when God imagines us, God probably is humanoid. We would create virtual realities with humans if we could, not of goats or Vulcans. So, it seems obvious, but that doesn’t mean it’s true. It is only what our imagination and the evidence suggest is most likely. But we know very little. We can’t go outside the simulation and check.

The simulation argument comes with uncertainties. Post-humans might lack sufficient computing power. Recent developments in quantum computing suggest otherwise. Alternatively, nearly all human civilisations die out before they can build these simulations. Alternatively, post-humans have evolved and differ from us, so they aren’t interested in running simulations with humans. We may only know this once we have become post-humans. One possibility is that a post-human is a humanlike artificial intelligence. Bostrom doesn’t try to guess the likelihood of the options. He thinks we have no information about whether this universe is real, but that is incorrect. There is evidence.

Latest update: 14 July 2026

Featured image: Inspired By The Treachery of Images.

1. Are You Living In a Computer Simulation? Nick Bostrom (2003). Philosophical Quarterly (2003) Vol. 53, No. 211, pp. 243-255.