Tag: financial crisis

Banking Operations

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Commercial versus savings banks

Historically, the banking sector comprised several types of banks. The distinction between commercial banks, which create money, and savings banks, which don’t, has lost its value due to the existence of efficient financial markets, where banks match terms through borrowing and lending. The distinction between created money and savings is arbitrary, as the following example demonstrates. Suppose that I work at a farm, and the farmer rewards me with a plot of land and leftover wood and materials from a defunct shed, which I use to build my home. After finishing my house, I go to the bank and take out a mortgage. The bank creates money out of thin air.

Until I went to the bank, no money had changed hands. Still, I was able to save for a home of my own. In other words, savings aren’t the same as money in a savings account. In this case, my savings are my home, and if the mortgage is a debt, the money I take out is my savings. To further illustrate the point, suppose that I have no money and also own no home. When I go to the bank for a car loan, the bank creates this money on the spot. If you think there are no savings, you are wrong again. The person who sold you the car had saved the car. I can even borrow money and put it in a savings account. And so, I created savings from thin air by borrowing money and lending it to the bank.

Full-reserve banking

A well-known monetary reform proposal is full reserve banking, as outlined in the Chicago Plan, which means there are only savings banks and no commercial banks that create money. It often resurfaces when banks go bankrupt. With full reserve banking, banks can’t lend out funds deposited in demand accounts or current accounts. Money in these accounts isn’t debt but backed by central bank currency or cash. And depositors can’t withdraw the money from their savings accounts on short notice. In this way, banks can’t go bankrupt because of depositors demanding payment in cash. With full reserve banking, loans must come from savings, which are funds that depositors can’t withdraw on demand, as they have entrusted them to the bank for an extended period.

Lack of cash is usually not the primary reason banks fail, but rather, loan write-offs. That was also the case during the 2008 financial crisis. Full reserve banking addresses a liquidity problem, whereas the crisis was a solvency issue that subsequently led to a liquidity issue. Banks ran into trouble, not because they lacked cash, but because they incurred losses on their loans. As a result, banks began to distrust one another and stopped lending to each other. The financial system can be safe with zero reserve banking, provided that banks are solvent, thus have sufficient capital, and own adequate liquid assets, such as government bonds, that they can sell to meet withdrawals. And so, a reserve requirement can better include liquid safe assets, such as government bonds, rather than currency alone.

Some proponents of full reserve banking are socialists who oppose privately controlled money creation, as they view it as a public subsidy to the private banking sector. Others desire a banking sector free from government interference, so a ‘free’ banking market without central bank interventions and deposit guarantees. At least that is something socialists and their opponents might agree on. Bank credit can contribute to economic cycles and financial crises. With full reserve banking, there would be less bank credit, and interest rates would be higher. To make lending possible, depositors must part with their money for a designated period of time to make it available for lending. As a result, fewer funds are available for lending, and interest rates would be higher.

Shadow banks

Full-reserve banking makes financial markets less efficient, allowing alternative schemes, such as shadow banks, to fill the gap. An example can illustrate that. Suppose that God has ordered banks only to use money in savings accounts for lending so that there is full reserve banking in Paradise. Eve and Adam only do business with each other. Both have €100 in their current account, which they use for their daily business transactions. This money is suitable for payment because it is in the current account. For that reason, they don’t receive interest. Assume now that the bank also offers savings accounts with an interest rate of 4% but money in savings accounts isn’t suitable for payment.

Then a financial advisor comes along, disguised as a snake, advising Eve and Adam for a reasonable fee on how to manage their payments between themselves and to deposit their money into a savings account. So, what you now read in Genesis is made up by bankers to hide their fraud, a conspiracy theorist might infer. But it is just a story. In this way, Eve and Adam both earn interest on their €100. They give each other credit, so that Eve can borrow €100 from Adam, and Adam can borrow €100 from Eve. They don’t need to keep money in their current accounts, so they deposit their funds into a savings account and earn interest. Everybody wins, Eve, Adam, and of course, that snakelike creature.

Initially, Eve and Adam had no savings, only money in their current accounts. The advisor’s scheme allows them to fabricate savings out of credit. It seems like creating money, but Eve and Adam gave each other credit. They agreed to pay later, which exposed both to credit risk. One of them might not repay because you can do so many different things with €100 than put it in a savings account. You can use credit, which is an agreement to pay later, and use it like money. And so, Paradise was lost. Similar schemes exist on a larger scale. These are shadow banks. Shadow banks don’t create money but credit. The difference between fractional reserve money and this type of credit may not be significant in practice, except that it is unregulated, resulting in little oversight.

When banks create money, they do the same. The banks act as intermediaries between Eve and Adam, allowing them to lend money to each other even when they do not conduct business with each other or do not trust each other. The bank also assumes the risk that a debtor will fail to repay and receives a reward in the form of interest. It is also credit, but we refer to it as money because the law regards bank credit as legal tender, thus money. The government backs this scheme, as a stable financial system is a key public interest. Banks must have sufficient capital and reserves to meet emergencies. For that reason, banks are subject to regulations, while shadow banks are not subject to these rules, allowing the latter to offer more competitive interest rates.

As a result, the role of traditional banking has declined. Large corporations could lend and borrow in money markets at rates better than those offered by banks. At the same time, retail investors could invest directly in money markets and get better yields than banks offer. This development started with corporate borrowing. It later expanded into mortgages. The primary reason for regulating banks is that they operate the payment system, which is of public interest, and can borrow from the Federal Reserve. It prompted banks to strip their balance sheets and expose themselves to off-balance sheet risks to generate higher returns on their capital. For instance, offering an emergency credit line to a shadow bank generated profits while not appearing on the balance sheet.

The 2008 financial crisis originated in shadow banks that invested in risky assets, rather than conventional banks that create money through lending. Shadow banks aren’t subject to the same regulations as traditional banks, so they made speculative investments in mortgages. These investments appeared safe because rating agencies failed to do their jobs. Regular banks encountered trouble because they had backed shadow banks, hoping to reap a quick profit from credit insurance. The word they use is off-balance sheet financing. The regular bank didn’t lend money, but guaranteed credit to shadow banks in case of emergency, which is as dangerous as keeping the mortgages on its own balance sheet. But that was legal. It allowed banks to make more money from the same capital. Money creation, therefore, wasn’t the problem, and replacing regular banks with shadow banks could further destabilise the financial system.

If a financial crisis were to occur with loan write-offs, full reserve banking would only ensure that money in current accounts is safe. However, the same problems would emerge in savings accounts. Savings banks can expose themselves to off-balance sheet risks, unless that is forbidden. And they can also go belly up. And they did. If the debtors of a bank fail to meet their obligations, the bank may face financial difficulties, and the savings it holds may be at risk. Also, with full reserve banking, governments and central banks may end up supporting savings banks and even shadow banks to ensure financial stability, thereby rendering the benefits of full reserve banking void. After all, the initial cause was never a liquidity problem, but a solvency issue.

Commercial versus investment banks

The Glass-Steagall Act in the United States severed linkages between regular banking and investment activities that contributed to the 1929 stock market crash and the ensuing depression. Separating banking from investing can prevent banks from providing loans to corporations in which they have invested. The measure aimed to make bankers more prudent. The separation of commercial and investment banking prevented securities firms and investment banks from taking deposits. The reason for the separation was the conflict of interest that arose from banks investing in securities with their own assets, which were their account holders’ deposits. Banks were obliged to protect the account holder’s deposits and should not engage in speculative activities.

The Glass-Steagall Act included the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC), which guaranteed bank deposits up to a specified limit. It also comprised Regulation Q, which prohibited banks from paying interest on demand deposits and capped interest rates on other deposit products. Maximising interest rates can limit the risks banks are willing to take on loans, as these risks can destabilise the financial system.

Until the 1980s, the legislation mainly remained unchanged. With the rise of neoliberalism, government regulations became increasingly disapproved of. Hence, the Glass-Steagall Act became increasingly disregarded, and diligent deregulators repealed it in 1999 as part of their effort to relieve businesses of government regulations that stood in the way of corporations making profits at the expense of the public good. Regulation Q ceilings for all account types, except demand deposits, were phased out during the 1980s. After the 2008 financial crisis, a renewed interest in the Glass-Steagall Act emerged.

In the United States, money market funds circumvented the limits imposed on banks by Regulation Q, luring depositors with higher interest rates, thereby undermining the prudent banking paradigm. The money market funds, which are shadow banks, invested in collateralised debt obligations (CDOs), such as mortgage-backed securities (MBS). The 2008 financial crisis started in money market funds, not traditional banks.

Natural Money works with the same principles. It distinguishes between regular banks, which provide loans, and investment banks, which are partnerships that invest in equity. Islamic banks also operate similarly. The maximum interest rate of zero works like Regulation Q, aiming to limit the risks banks are willing to take on deposits, as interest is a reward for taking on risk. Banking in a Natural Money financial system works as follows:

  • Regular banks make low-risk loans. The money in these banks is secure. The maximum interest rate is zero. And so, deposits have negative yields.
  • Investment banks don’t lend but participate in businesses by providing equity. They can rent houses and lease cars. Investment banks offer higher returns.
  • Both regular banks and investment banks can invest in government securities to manage their risk and meet withdrawals.
  • Regular banks can promise a fixed interest rate. The government may offer support and deposit guarantees.
  • Investment banks don’t guarantee returns. They pay dividends based on their profits. Its depositors are investors who can face losses.

Natural Money enhances financial stability by favouring equity investments over debt investments. The maximum interest rate makes debt investments less attractive. And there is no reward in the form of interest for engaging in high-risk lending, which enhances the financial system’s stability. It stands to reason that the integrity of the system depends on strict adherence to its principles and the termination of evasive, get-rich-quick schemes of financial parasites, which requires a belief in the vision behind the idea of a usury-free economy. Let’s not dismiss that as a fantasy immediately.

Sanitation of banking

The primary cause of the financial system’s failure is usury. Imagine what a maximum interest rate of zero on debts can do. Only the most creditworthy borrowers can get a loan. You may have to save and bring in equity before applying for a mortgage, and that may be the only credit you can obtain. Even an overdraft may be impossible. That may seem harsh, but it is even worse when indebted consumers reach the point of interest payments and can’t make ends meet. If you want to buy something, you have to save for it. Likewise, corporations need to attract capital rather than debt to meet their liquidity requirements. The financial sector will shrink, and much of modern finance may become redundant.

That said, individuals and businesses may obtain better deals in the money market, allowing them to opt for this option rather than a bank. The distinction between traditional banks and shadow banks may blur. Tradional banks may need fewer regulations while shadow banks may need more. That is because without interest, risk may disappear. The central bank may stand behind the payment system, but it may not have to stand behind the lending system. The implicit guarantee of central banks buying debt and issuing currency with a holding fee means that the warranty will remain unused.

Two other themes emerged during the 2008 financial crisis: ‘too big to fail’ and ‘too complex to understand.’ Complexity and size are the outcome of competition. The failure of a large bank can bring down the financial system, and the products traders in financial markets use to hedge their risks or improve their profitability can be complex. Our future civilisation could be simpler, so the sanitation of the financial system should encompass cooperation, simplification and diversification. It may look as follows:

  • There should be an exhaustive list of all legal financial products and their requirements. We shouldn’t allow other financial products to exist.
  • No bank should hold more than a certain percentage of the global market, and no bank should expose itself to more than a certain percentage of another bank.
  • Banks should share services where scale is crucial, such as technological infrastructure and advanced knowledge.

Smaller banks can achieve efficiency improvements by using the same technological infrastructure. As long as they are independent financial institutions, they may share an IT department and operate their businesses on the same software. It may even be a public infrastructure that all banks share, allowing for significant cost savings, while also sharing knowledge and implementing measures related to issues such as fraud prevention.

Latest revision: 13 November 2025

Featured image: Ara Economicus. Beverly Lussier (2004). Wikimedia Commons. Public Domain.

Graffiti near the Renfe station of Vitoria-Gasteiz

The monster called financial system

nivtric4 Comments

Is the financial sector overtaking the real economy?

Less than 1% of foreign exchange transactions are made for trading goods and services. More than 80% are made for exchange rate speculation. Every three days an entire year’s worth of the European Union’s GDP of € 13 trillion is traded in the foreign exchange markets.1 So is the financial sector overtaking the real economy?

Financial industry share of total nonfarm business profits. Evan Soltas (2013)
Financial industry share of total non-farm business profits. Evan Soltas (2013). Economics and Thought.

In the United States financial sector profits grew from 10% of total non-farm business profits in 1947 to 50% in 2010.2 This figure excludes bonuses. It is explosive stuff and the original research has been removed from the Internet. The findings could give us the impression that the financial sector is a big fat parasite that feeds on us. And who would have guessed that?

What a scary monster the financial system has become. This terrible creature could easily wipe out human civilisation as we know it. That nearly happened in 2008. And it can still happen. We are hostage of this monster. It is too big to fail. But what created it? It wasn’t Frankenstein for sure. The answer is already out there for thousands of years. It is interest on money and loans. In the past this was called usury and often forbidden.

The core problem is that incomes fluctuate while interest payments are fixed. This causes instability in the financial system. And if the investment is more risky, lenders demand a higher interest rate, which contributes to the risk. Limiting interest would reduce leverage and make financial system more stable and less prone to crisis.

It’s the usury, stupid!

Fraud in the financial sector contributed to the financial crisis of 2008. To what extent the fraud or the size of the financial sector are to blame is less clear. Financial crises are not a recent phenomenon. They have caused economic crises in the past. For instance, the stock market crash of 1929 and the subsequent bank failures caused the Great Depression of the 1930s. Back then the financial sector was not as large as it is today and there was no large-scale mortgage fraud. Hence, there must be another cause.

Charging fixed interest rates on debts causes problems as incomes fluctuate. So if some person’s income or some corporation’s profit suddenly drops, interest payments may not be met. When the economy slows down that happens to a lot of people and corporations simultaneously, which makes the financial system prone to crisis. And interest is a reward for risk. Creditors may be willing to lend money to people and corporations that are already deeply in debt, but only if they receive a higher interest rate. So if interest was forbidden, that might not happen, and there could be fewer financial crises.

Banning interest has been tried in the past and it failed time after time. That is because without interest lending and borrowing wouldn’t be possible and the economy would come to a standstill. Until now there was a shortage of money and capital so interest rates needed to be positive, but that may be about to change. The increased availability of money and capital pushed interest rates lower. Money and capital may soon be so abundant that interest rates can go negative. That could be the end of usury.

The scary monsters in the financial system

Apart from exchange rate speculation there are frightening creatures like quantitative easing, shadow banks and derivatives. These things will be explained later in this post. Some experts believe that the financial sector is out of control. That may not be the case. Usury created this monster so Natural Money, which is negative interest rates and a maximum interest rate of zero, could make many of these seemingly hard-to-solve issues disappear, and perhaps shrink financial sector profits too.

Leverage, shadow banking and derivatives make the financial sector so profitable for its operators because of interest and risk. Interest is a reward for risk but interest also increases risk because interest charges are fixed while incomes aren’t. But more risk means more profit for the usurers because all that risk needs to be ‘managed’. That provides opportunities to profit for those who make the deals. Usury is the main cause of financial crises and generates most financial sector profits.

Quantitative easing

Quantitative easing means that central banks print money to buy debt with this newly created money. Trillions of dollars and euros have been printed so central banks now own trillions in debt. In this way the financial crisis of 2008 was stemmed. Investors and banks wanted to get rid of debts and preferred cash because there was a risk that some of these debts would not be repaid in full. This caused the crisis.

But what if there was a tax of 10% per year on cash and central bank deposits? Losing a few percent on bad debts suddenly doesn’t seem such a bad deal any more. Investors may have kept these debts and the crisis would not have occurred. The losses on bad mortgages turned out to be a lot less than 10% per year. That was also because the crisis was halted with central bank actions like quantitative easing.

If there had been a tax on cash and central bank deposits there would always have been liquidity. The crisis may never have happened in the first place and quantitative easing may not have been needed. And if this tax is going to be implemented in the future, investors may gladly gobble up the debt on the balance sheets of central banks, so that quantitative easing can be undone, and most likely at a profit for the taxpayer.

Shadow banks

In order to protect depositors, banks are subject to regulations. Regulations are bad for profits because they limit the risks banks can take. Bankers who were looking for bigger bonuses came up with a scheme that is now called shadow banks. Shadow banks don’t offer deposit accounts to ordinary people so regulations don’t apply. And so shadow banks can take more risk and generate more profits.

A shadow bank borrows money from investors and invests it in products like mortgage-backed securities. A mortgage-backed security is a derivative that looks like a bunch of mortgages. The owner of the security doesn’t own the mortgages themselves, but is entitled to the interest from the mortgages but also the losses when home owners fall behind on their payments. Not owning the mortgages themselves makes trading a lot easier because mortgages involve a lot of paperwork.

Shadow banks can be dangerous because bank regulations don’t apply. Ordinary banks are required to have a certain amount of capital to cushion losses so that depositors can be paid out in full when some loans aren’t repaid. The balance sheet of an ordinary bank might look like the one below:

debit
credit
mortgages and loans
€ 70,000,000
deposits
€ 60,000,000
loans to other banks
€ 10,000,000
deposits from other banks
€ 20,000,000
cash, central bank deposits
€ 10,000,000
the bank’s net worth
€ 10,000,000
total
€ 90,000,000
total
€ 90,000,000

But shadow banks don’t need to comply to these regulations because they don’t have depositors. And so the balance sheet of a shadow bank might look like this:

debit
credit
mortgage-backed securities
€ 500,000,000
short-term lending in money markets
€ 490,000,000
insurance and credit lines
the shadow bank’s net worth € 10,000,000
total
€ 500,000,000
 total € 500,000,000

What is so great about shadow banking, at least for bankers? If banks borrow at 2% and lend at 4%, the ordinary bank can make € 1,400,000. The bank’s net worth is € 10,000,000 so the return on investment is 14%. But the shadow bank can make € 10,000,000 and the return on investment is 100%. And you can imagine how great this is for bonuses. Only, if something goes wrong, there is little capital to cushion losses. That’s not a problem for the bankers because by then they have already cashed their bonuses. But it could become our problem as shadow banks can blow up the financial system.

If the loans drop 10% in value because some home owners fall back on their mortgage payments, the capital of the ordinary bank can cushion the loss of € 8,000,000, while the shadow bank goes down in flames leaving an unpaid debt of € 40,000,000. And now we get to the point where financial system blew up. It is the insurance and credit lines part on the balance sheet of the shadow bank. There is no value attached because credit lines so insurances don’t show up on balance sheets or only for a very low amount.

Ordinary banks guaranteed credit to shadow banks just in the case investors like money market funds didn’t want to invest in shadow banks any more. The great thing of credit lines for bankers is that they get a fee for these credit lines while they don’t appear on the balance sheet so that banks don’t have to cut back their lending. When homeowners fell behind on their payments, investors didn’t want to invest in shadow banks any more, and these credit lines had to be used. This means that ordinary banks had to step in and suddenly their capital wasn’t sufficient to cover the losses. Also going down in flames, were the insurers of mortgage-backed securities.

The United States had a government policy of stimulating home ownership. Under the guise of this policy mortgages were given to people who couldn’t afford them. Behind the scenes usury was to blame. If there was doubt whether the borrower could afford the mortgage, a banker could charge a higher interest rate to compensate for the risk. This made the mortgage even less affordable to the borrower. The solution for that problem was giving ‘teaser rates’, meaning that the interest rate was low during the first year so that the home owner could afford the mortgage payments at first. Meanwhile the mortgage was packaged in a mortgage-backed security so the banker was already off the hook when the home owner fell behind on his or her payments.

And there is more. Shadow banks offer higher interest rates to their investors. Shadow banks don’t have a lot of capital so investing in them is a more risky than putting money in a bank account of a regular bank. Investors in shadow banks need a compensation for that risk. That’s no problem because the enterprise is very profitable. It is therefore possible for shadow banks to pay higher interest rates. This might not be possible if interest was forbidden, unless shadow banks had a lot more capital to cover their losses, but that would solve the problem of them being too risky. It is usury that allows for risky schemes like shadow banks to exist.

The multi-trillion-dollar derivatives monster

In 2016 the notational value of all outstanding derivatives is estimated to be $650 trillion. This is the so-called multi-trillion derivatives monster. This figure is more than eight times the total income of everyone in the world.3 Some people are spooked by the sheer size of that number. And indeed, derivatives can be dangerous. In 2003 the famous investor Warren Buffet called derivatives ‘financial weapons of mass destruction’.

Five years later derivatives played a major role in the financial crisis. An improper use of derivatives nearly brought down the world financial system. But derivatives can be useful. Most banks use derivatives to hedge their risks. Banks that managed their risks well using derivatives fared relatively well during the financial crisis compared to banks that didn’t.4 Therefore, derivatives are probably here to stay.

But what about the multi trillion monster? The number is a notational value, not a real value. Derivatives are insurance contracts, often against default of a corporation, a change in interest rates, or home owners falling behind on mortgage payments. You may have a fire insurance on your house to the amount of € 200,000. This is the notational value of the contract. You may pay the insurer € 200 per year. That is the real value of the contract, until something happens, that is.

If your house burns down, the contract suddenly is worth € 200,000. Insurers often re-insure their risks, which is a prudent practice. But re-insurance makes the notational value of the outstanding derivatives increase. So if your insurer re-insures half of your fire insurance to reduce its risk exposure, another contract with notational value of € 100,000 is added to the pile of existing insurance contracts.

So what went wrong? If suddenly half the houses in a nation catch fire because there is a war, insurers go bankrupt. The cause of the financial crisis was many home owners falling behind on their payments at the same time so that insurers of derivative contracts like mortgage-backed securities went bankrupt. The American International Group (AIG) was the largest insurer of these contracts and it was bailed out with $ 188 billion. The US government made a profit of $ 22 billion on this bailout, but only because the financial system wasn’t allowed to collapse.

In a financial crisis a lot of things go wrong at the same time. The financial system can’t deal with a major crisis. If it happens, it may cause the greatest economic depression ever seen, and in retrospect it may herald the collapse of civilisation.

The usury issue

Money circulation in the economy is like blood circulating in the body. It makes no sense for a kidney or a lung to keep some blood just in case the blood stops circulation. The precautionary act makes the dreaded event happen. It is a self-fulfilling prophecy. A financial crisis is like all parts of the body scrambling for blood at the same time. When the blood circulation stops, a person dies. An if the money circulation stops, the economy dies. Hoarding is to blame for that.

Perhaps big banks are too big to fail. Breaking them up may not help because the banking system is closely integrated. Banks lend money to each other. If a few banks fail then others get into trouble too. And in a crisis all the trouble happens at the same time. So perhaps it is better to address the cause of failure itself, which is interest on money and debts. And it may be possible because interest rates are poised to go negative.

A tax on cash makes negative interest rates possible. It can also keep investors from hoarding money. If money keeps on circulating, there may never be a crisis. The crisis happened because investors scrambled for cash when they feared they might lose money on bad debts. But if they expect to lose more on cash, they might keep their debts. And there may have been fewer bad debts in the first place if there had been no interest on debts as interest is a reward for risk.

Featured image: Graffiti near the Renfe station of Vitoria-Gasteiz. Wikimedia Commons. Public Domain.

1. The rise of money trading has made our economy all mud and no brick. Alex Andreou (2013). The Guardian. [link]
2. The Rise of Finance. Evan Soltas (2013). Economics and Thought. [no link because the information has been removed]
3. Here’s What Makes the Derivatives “Monster” So Dangerous (for You). Michael E. Lewitt (2016). Money Morning. [link]
4. Financial innovation and bank behavior: Evidence from credit markets. Lars Norden, Consuelo Silva Buston and Wolf Wagner (2014). Tilburg University. [link]